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; ~l THF: SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'II 
f'ln l ,,t ift-Responrlent, 
Case No. 19150 
[1efendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from jury verdicts finding him 
guilty of Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-2-203 (1953), as amended, 
NJqravatecl Robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation of 
~ 76-6-302 ( 1953), as amended, and Theft, a second-degree 
fPlony, in violation of~ 76-6-404 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Aµpellant was tried by jury on March 10-11, 1983, in 
the Tl,ird Judicial. District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
c,t,-,1- c,f lit ah, tbe Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding. 
1-:..· ,.,, - c;r'1•tenced on March 2g, 1983. On the aggravated 
,,, 1,-- w.-,,-, se,1t enced to an indeterminate term 
years nor more than life in the Utah 
"-' irtsc,n. nn the aggravated robbery conviction, he was 
also sentenced to five years to life in the rJtah State> Prison. 
He was sentencr-"ci tlJ one r_n f1ft(:.pn vear.s on the> th<'ft 
conviction. The thrcr- s0ntPnC't'-::'S vn,rP ntrl•_.re.-l tn run 
concurrently. 
RELIFF SOUGHT ON APPFAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the appellant's 
convictions and sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 15, 1980, Bert Holland answered the 
doorbell at about 10 p.m. at his home in Salt Lake City, Utah 
(T. 39). Two men in their twenties asked for someone who was 
not at the home (T. 40). One of the men pulled a gun out his 
coat, the two men entered the house, and they ordered Holland 
to call his wife into the room (T. 40). They taped Mr. 
Holland's hands and feet with duct tape as he lay on the floor 
( T. 41). They ordered Lorna Holland to lie on top of her 
husband and they also taped her hands (T. 41). 
One of the men stayed in the same room with the 
Hollands, looked into a closet, went through Lorna's purse and 
took her werldin') rinqs from h»r finqer (T. 41, fiS). The other 
man had gone upstairs to a herlruorn anrl came hack down with 
bedding, which he threw ove>t th•' to1• nf fl»rr anrl Lnrna anr1 
which completely covered them (T, 41, F.4). 
Thr· llollanrls thereafter could not see the two men 
1" .ir tl11·m searchinq throughout the home (T. 41. 64). The 
".h· i f,n "s'"'lC papers" but the f!ollanrls dirl not know 
They asked for 
ti"· 1cc.111hi11ation to a safe, which the Hollands gave them, and 
they also askerl about gold, silver anrl jewelry (T. 43-44). 
Tf,0 .1ssailants took rings, necklaces, jewelry, a shotgun, a 
war ch ancl silver coins (T. 46). The property was valued at 
about Sl,000 (T. 46). The two men apparently had not found 
what they were initially looking for in the 15 minutes they 
were at the Hollands' home (T. 43, 66). They placed a couch 
on top of Lorna and Bert Holland and left the home (T. 45, 
Ii r,) • 
The Hollanrls gave a description of the assailants to 
the investigating officers. There were no other witnesses, 
nor were fingerprints rliscovered at the scene (T. 81). 
On December 22, 1980, Detective Daryle Ondrak of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office showerl about 50 photographs 
of inrlivirluals to Bert and Lorna Holland but no positive 
iclentification of the two assailants was made at that time (T. 
4'!-Sfl, 6R, 81). Photographs of appellant and James Nix Rafal 
1-10n· not inclurlecl in that photograph book (T. 82). 
In November 1981, the investigation led to several 
I I" de;, 11WllJ•iinq a[)pc>llant ancl cTames Nix Rafal (T. 84). 
•,1~"' •1u0st inn0.1 and he provirled rletailed accounts 
.,r it i 1w; ct imes, including those committerl aqainst the 
'1»11.rnds (T. 88-89). 
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A photographic rlisplay, coritainin1 six pi,'t1Jres nf 
six men, was preparerl by Salt Lak<· Cnt1nty Shccriff's d••tf·ct i:"" 
in March 1982 (T. 83). It was sent tn pnl ice <let rcct ive:; 1n 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, where it was shown to Rert and Lorna 
Holland (T. 83). Bert made a positive identification of 
photograph number 1 (James Nix Rafal) as one of the 
as sa il ant s ( T • 5 5 , 9 2 ) . He also choose photographs 4 and fi 
(Robert Taylor and appellant, respectively), either of which 
he thought may have been the other assailant (T. 55, 92). 
Lorna Holland, in a separate identification session, 
was shown the same display of six photographs (T. fi9). She 
selected photograph 4 as representing one of the assailants 
(T. 69, 93). Photograph 4 depicted Robert Taylor, who 
apparently was not involved with the crimes (T. q4). 
Mr. and 'lrs. Holland positively identified appellant 
as one of the assailants at the preliminary hearing and at 
trial (T. 46, 'i3-54, 67-72, 93-04). 
Out of the presence of the jury, defenrlant mane a 
motion to dismiss the theft count after both the State and 
defense had rested (T. 217). The motion apparently was denied 
but there is no further rliscussion of it in the trial 
transcript. Defense counsel aJain moverl to rlismiss the theft 
count at sentencing (T. 270). The mnt ion was rlenierl by ~udqe 
Conder without explanation (T. 270). 
Appellant was thereafter cnnvic·tl°rl of a']qravated 
robbery, aggravated burC] lary and t hPft. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S SEPARATE CONVICTION OF THEFT 
Wl\S PROPER BECAUSE THEFT IS NOT A LESSER 
I~CLUDED OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
On arpeal, appellant contends that the trial judge 
erred by not dismissing the theft charge because it is a 
lPsser inclurled offense of aggravated robbery, and that the 
trial judge erred at sentencing because the theft convict ion 
merged into the aggravated robbery conviction. He claims that 
rroof of the elements of aggravated robbery also proves a 
theft and, therefore, he cannot be convicted of both crimes. 
Appellant challenges the theft conviction and seeks a 
dismissal of that conviction and sentence. 
A. The statutory elements of theft are 
different than the statutory elements of 
aggravated robbery, and are not 
necessarily included in the offense of 
aggravated robbery. 
The standards for determining when an offense is a 
lesser included offense of another were recently explained in 
_s_t_<:_t_e __ v_._~a_k_e_r_, Utah, No. 1824'i (filed September 21, 1983). 
When the prosecution requests a jury instruct ion on lesser 
included offenses, the proper stanc'lard requires "a comparison 
of the statutory elements of the offenses in the abstract." 
H,, slip op. at 2. When the defendant requests a jury 
i 11q r •rct ion on lesser included offenses, the proper standard 
-5-
"requires an analysis of the 0virl~nce offererl at trial." Irl. 
criminal violatinns, the prn~ ( 1,dt i()fl m11st cn111 1ily wilh thP 
"narrower" standatrl, a r_ 1 •1!1)!.Jt1snn l)t th0 st n.t ulnry Plf:>rnont'> !if 
the various offenses. l\t the t im0 ,, er iminal information is 
filed, the prosecution clo0s n11t know what evidence will in 
fact be admittecl at trial, or if the eviclence supports more 
than one conviction, or what interpretation the trier of fact 
will give the evidence. Thus, the prosecution at that point 
must comply with the standard which compares the statutory 
elements of the crimes. When the prosecution co~pares the 
statutory elements of the crime and concludes that one crime 
is not a lesser includecl offense of another, then the 
prosecution should be allowed to charge the defendant with 
violating each of the offenses. 
'!'he standard which compares the abstract statutory 
elements of the offenses states that "[t J he lesser offense 
must be a necessary element of the <Jreater offense and must o' 
necessity be embraced within the legal definition of the 
gr eat er offense and be a pa i:t there of." ~-a_t_e __ v_. __ ~o_o_l_m~~, R 4 
Utah 2 3, 3 6 , 3 3 P. 2d fi 4 0, 6 4 5 ( 1934 ) • In State v. Ri:ennan, -----------------
13 Utah 2d 195, 198, 371 P.:>'1 27, 29 (1962), this Court set 
forth the requirements of an incl uclcd of fenso as follows: 
Tht> rule as to w!,r=n 011F of fcnsr• is 
incluclecl in ar·,rithrt i~, that thP 111eater 
offense inc]uriPs a lr-?:-;s~r (Jnc w~V'tl 
establishment of thP rpPatPT wnuUl 
necessarily incl udr· pr1)1;f <Jf all th0 
elements necessary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when proof of the 
lesser offense requires some element not 
involved in the greater offense that the 
lesser would not be an included offense. 
[Footnote omitted.] 
1'1,, "rwcessarily included offense," or statutory comparison of 
the elements, standard has been codified in Utah Code Ann. 
~ 77-35-~l(e)(l953) as amended: 
The jury may return a verdict of 
guilty to the offense charged or to any 
offense necessarily included in the 
offense charged or an attempt to commit 
either the offense charged or an offense 
necessarily included therein. 
Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-1-402(5)(1953), as amended, also refers to 
necessarily included offenses: 
If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgement, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall 
determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the 
offense charged but that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of 
conviction may be set aside or reversed 
and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity 
of a new trial, if such relief is sought 
by the defendant. 
Under the "necessarily included offense" standard, 
the determination of whether theft is a lesser included 
offense within the crime of aggravated robbery requires an 
0 xirn1ination of the respective elements of those crimes. The 
l'rn<nts c1t aqc3ravated robbery as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
't. h-Hl} (1951), as amended, are: 
-7-
( l I 
I 0[1 t>t:·· L v l I 
tohtli:::_:>r'/ IH'· 
r a 1 
I 1-,, 
f ,, 
df J< Jfl; 
a firearm. 
or a clecid 1 
( b I a,_, :-;1 S'._ r l ,- 1 1.:, 
)ITilfl l t \ 1 nr l 
" fdc·:;i:ni l<' ,,f 
,., 1 I " of a kn i f ,. 
(3) For tlw f'Uti•J'P nt this part, an 
act shal 1 he neerne<l t" ''" "in the course 
of cornrnitt in1J a r(j\,t.1•t y" if il occurs in 
an attempt to commit, rluring the 
com'l\issinn of, ,-,r iri the immerliate flight 
after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Robery is clef ined in Utah Code Ann. ~ 7()-6-301 ( 1953), as 
amended, as: 
I l l tl-ie unlawful and 
intentional ta>.1ng of personal property, 
in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate> presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or 
fear, 
These elements of a0gr~vated robbery were qiven in 
substantially the sa'l\e f:)rrn to the jury in Instructions 17 and 
23 (R. 108, 117). 
The Plements of theft as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
~ 7 6- 6- 4 0 4 ( 19 5 J \ , as ame no e d , are : 
A. person rnmrnit.s thc>ft if he 
obtain~ or exercises unauthorized control 
over the propertv of another with a 
purpnse tn neptl~P him thereof. 
In the instant easi.:=-· the pr osec ut ion could 
reasonably cone] une at th·· t i:111· ci i 11f1ir mnt ion was filed that 
.,,,. nf a.1·1tavatecl robbery 
because the statutory' r-"1f::irnentc- 11f- r!1lf"r~-,nt. There are t hlf 
elements reC)uired f.:.n 
not reguiren foi proof ,,r tli••f; 
"" ';" of committing robbery, the taking must be accomplished 
i r1•; •Jf force or fear, and the actor must have used a 
, "' '' ,,, knife or facsimile of the same or a deadly weapon or 
1,.,,,,, car1srcc1 serious boclily injury upon another. 
There are two adclitional elements required for 
ptorlf of theft that are not required for proof of aggravatecl 
One clif ference is that obtaining control with the 
purpose to deprive is an essential element of theft. The 
purpose to deprive required by the theft statute is a more 
specific kincl of intent which goes beyond the intent required 
for aggravatecl robbery. An intentional taking is required by 
~ 7n-6-301, the robbery statute, which is incorporated by 
reference in the aggravated robbery statute. Intentionally is 
dPfinecl in Utah Code Ann. E; 76-2-103(1) (1953), as amendecl, 
as: 
A person engages in conduct: 
( 1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
wilfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result. 
Sc<' also: ,Jury Instruction Number 11 (R. 102). 
Theft requires that the taking be with the "purpose 
tri deprive," which is defined in Utah Code Ann. Ii> 76-6-401(3) 
!Jqr,1), ac; amendecl, as having: 
-9-
See also: 
( e ) . t he cons c i <111 c; '1li i el' t : 
(a) To withl1<Jlrl ptUJ><'rty perm,1nently 
or for so extenrlecl a P'-'r incl or to usP 
uncler such cirr:umstilnc<>s th.1\ a 
suhstantial rortion of its pcnnomic value, 
or of the use ancl henefit th0reof, would 
be lost; or 
( b ) To restore t he pt ope rt y on 1 y 
upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property uncler 
circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it. 
Jury Instruct ion Number 25 ( R. 121-122). 
The "purpose to deprive" is a culpahle mental state 
required as an essential element of the crime of theft and is 
by definition more specific than the intentional, knowing or 
reckless mental state generally required by the Utah Criminal 
Code. Where the allegecl lesser included offense requires 
proof of a more specific intent, it cannot stanc1 in the lesser 
included relationship. _s_t_ate _ _y_. __ ~c:_i,_ri_EC_, Utah, 618 P. 2d 33 
(1980), State~.__~t:_~~~~~, Utah, 621 P.2cl 1288 (1980), ~t__~t__~ 
~.___'l'_uc~e_i:_, Utah, 618 P.2d 46 (1980). Thus, the appellant can 
be guilty of the "greater" offense (aggravated robhery) 
without also committing the "lesser" crime (theft). 
"Purpose to rleprive" is an element of theft which is 
requirerl in addition to proof that the person Acted 
intentionally or knowin<Jly. The "purpose to deprive" is not, 
however, an element of ag'_lravalte--l ro!Jbioty an<l it is not 
embraced within the legal clef in it ion of a'J'lt avatecl robbery. 
Theft also differs fr()m dcJJtil"at el robbery because 
theft requires that the value of thio rr--ipert y he proved as an 
-ln-
, l"lll'cnt to determine if the crime is a second-degree felony, 
, , ,1. i0,1r<>e felony, class A misdemeanor or a class B 
'",, l<·m»anor. -~t-~t_e __ v_. __ I,_l:!_<:_e_r_e>_, 28 Utah 2d 61, 498 P.2d 350 
( 1 y 72). AgC)ravated robbery does not require that the value of 
the property be established. Sta_t_EC__~l'!__!_l'!_t_ere~t_-~_13_._2:_B_._, 
Utah, 5q7 P.2d 1333 (1979). Because value does not have to be 
proved for aggravated robbery, value is an additional element 
of theft. 
Theft is also not a lesser included offense of 
aggravated robbery because an attempt will suffice for 
conviction of aggravated robbery, while theft requires a 
completed act. An "unlawful and intentional taking" is 
required for committing robbery. However, an intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of another need 
not be proved for aggravated robbery. This is because the 
completed act of robbery (the intentional taking) is not 
required; an attempt to commit robbery is sufficient. Section 
76-6-302 states in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated 
robbery if ~_!: he _ _£_o_urse~com_m_i_!:_!:_i_~ 
_i:_o_bbEC_r_x, 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an 
act shall be deemed to be "in the course 
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in 
an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of the 
robbery. 
i l'rnt,f•,,'-' i c; arlded.) "In the course of committing robbery" is 
not a completed act, and it is different from the completed 
act of "obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
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property of another" for the crime of theft. IJt ah Cod<> Ann. 
~ 76-64-404 (1953), as amendecl. 
Under~ 76-4-101(1), a rerson is quilty nf ari 
attempt if: 
[Alcting with the kincl of 
culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
Because the completed act, and "unlawful ancl intentional 
taking," is required for robbery, theft may be arguecl to be a 
lesser included offense of robbery. However, under the 
attempt theory, no actual taking of property needs to be 
proved for aggravated robbery. 
Theft does require a completed act, specifically 
that the person "obtains or exercises unauthorized control." 
Therefore, theft requires an element which is not required for 
aggravated robbery when aggravated robbery is proved under the 
attempt theory. 
The result is that theft is not necessarily and not 
at all times a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. 
Because the crime of theft in the abstract contains more 
elements than aggravatecl robbery, theft cannot be a lesser 
included offense of aggravatecl robbery. Appellant was 
properly charged and convicted of theft ancl aqgravated 
robbery. 
B. Appellant was not ent it le,l to a 
dismissal of the theft cha11es because 
under the evidence-hase<1 standard theft 
was not a lesser incl11de,1 offense of 
aggravated robbery. 
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If the defendant requests a jury instruction on 
',,., inclucled offenses, the proper standard requires an 
"' ,1,; ts uf the eviclence offered at trial. In -~t-~t-~_v_. __ B_a_k_~r_, 
111 "h, tJo. 18245 (filecl September 21, 1983), the defendant was 
d1argecl with one offense, burglary, but the defendant argued 
that the evidence required a jury instruction on another 
crime, criminal trespass, which he argued was a lesser 
included offense of burglary. 
The present case differs in several respects from 
Baker on the lesser included offense issue. In the case at 
bar, the prosecution charged appellant with three crimes, but 
appellant claims that, at the most, he could only be charged 
with two crimes. Baker was charged with only one crime, but 
he sought a smaller sentence on a lesser inclucled offense 
theory. Appellant's request at trial also differs slightly 
from the jury instruction request made by Baker. Appellant 
did not request a jury instruction on a lesser inclucled 
offense. Insteaa, appellant made a motion to Clismiss the 
theft charge because appellant argued theft was a lesser 
incluaea offense of aggravated robbery, ana therefore, 
appellant could not be convicted of both the "greater" and the 
"lesser" crimes. The motion was denied at trial and at 
sentencing, and appellant was found guilty of theft and 
"'Jqr,1vated robbery. 
Tile clefendant in _f2_a_k_~r_ requested a jury instruction 
on lesser include(! offenses. The appellant in the case at bar 
made a motion to clismiss. In each case, the Clefendants were 
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seeking the same result hasec1 on the lrsscr incltH1Prl offense 
rationale: a defenda11t can he"' 1_1):1»' i ,·t_ ed of t hr: 11 qreat 0r" er i ':-1 1 
or the "lesser" ctime hut not rit huth c·1imPs. Recause the 
issue on lesser inclucfr>rl ,,ffr11scs w,1s raised hy appC'llant, it 
might be ar0uerl that rhF' stan<li1trl fnt determining when a crime 
is a lesser included offense of another is that of analyzing 
the evidence offered at trial. 1'espnndent submits that this 
standard should not apply. ~owever, even under this standarrl, 
appellant's argument lacks merit. 
The evirlence-based standard is followerl in cases 
when the evidence and circumstances 1ustify: 
When an appellant makes an issue of a 
refusal to instruct on included offenses, 
we will survey the evidence, anrl the 
inferences, which admit of rational 
deduction, to determine if there exists 
reasonable basis upon which a conviction 
of the lesser offense coulrl rest. 
[Footnote omitterl.] 
~-t~~-~u_g_h_EC_r_t_z, Utah, S 5 0 P. 2rl 17 s, 17 fi ( 19 76). Th is 
evidence based standarrl is incorporated in Utah Corle Ann. 
~ 76-1-402(4) (1953), as amended, which provides: 
The court shall not be obligaterl to 
charge the jury with respect to an 
included nffense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verrlict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
Included offenses are rlefined in lllah Cncle Ann. 
~ 76-1402(3)(1953), as ilrnenclerl, w'1irl1 ';ays that an offense is 
included in a charged offense when: 
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(a) It is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of 
\-he offen.se charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
.solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by 
a statute as a lesser included offense. 
As in -~t_a_1:_EC__':_~_~a_ke~, Utah, No. 18245 (filed 
September 21, 1983), this case arguably involves the 
definition in (3)(a), which requires an analysis of the facts 
at trial. 
If the same facts tend to prove elements 
of more than one statutory offense, then 
the offenses are related under ~ 76-1-402. 
The application of~ 76-l-402(3)(a) will 
thus require some reference to the 
statutory elements of the offenses 
involved in order to determine whether 
given facts are "required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged." This 
requirement that there exist some overlap 
in the statutory elements of allegedly 
"included" offenses would prevent the 
argument that totally unrelated offenses 
could be deemed included simply because 
some of the evidence necessary to prove 
one crime was also necessary to prove the 
other. [W]here two offenses are 
related because some of their statutory 
elements overlap, and where the evidence 
at trial of the greater offense includes 
proof of some or all of those overlapping 
elements, the lesser offense is an 
included offense under subsection (3)(a}. 
~t_a_t_e __ v_. __ R_a_k_e_r_, I_d_., slip op. at 9 (emphasis in original). 
If an offense is included within the meaning of 
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[u]nder ~ 76-l-4n2(4l, the cn11ti t'' 
obligated tn i11st 1 cJ1:t '"' I h" leo,c;1't 
offense only if the evi,Je11cc offe1<'d 
provides a "tat1onal has1s f,-" a verdirt 
acquitting the defenlant 11f the nff<-ense 
charged and cnnvi,-ti11q hi111 nf the included 
offense." 
Id. 'T'here are two situations when the trial court must give a 
jury instruction on lesser included offenses upon the 
defendant's request. The first situation is "[w]hen the 
elements of two offenses overlap . if there is a 
sufficient quantum of evidence to" acquit him of the greater 
offense. ~t_~t_e_.2_~_Ba~~r_, Id. , s 1 i r op. at 1 O. The second 
situation is "when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore 
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and 
convict ion of the lesser." Id. 
This appeal involves a motion by appellant that 
theft must be dismissed because it is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated robbery. It is the State's posit ion 
that under the evidence-based standard the same facts did not 
prove elements of both theft and aggravated robbery. The 
elements of the these crimes are different, as discussed in 
Point IA, and that no elements nf the crimes overlap. 
The same facts were nor usecl to prove theft ann 
aggravated robbery. Appellant committed aqqravaten robbery 
when the wedning rings were taken from Lorna Hc,lland's 
fingers. It was the unlawful and "nlent i0nal taking, by usinq 
a firearm, of personal property frnm l~rna Holland's person 
against her will, accomplished by means of force or fear. At 
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that roint, the aggravated robbery was only committed against 
·1 nci Hol lancl. The aggravated robbery was not committed 
, 1 '' "'"l r1,,rt Holland at that roint in time because nothing was 
t .iken from "his person, or [from his] immediate presence." 
See Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-6-301 (1953), as amended. 
Thefts were thereafter committed against both Lorna 
and Bert Holland. The separate offense of theft was committed 
when appellant went into other areas of the house, out of the 
immediate presence of Lorna and Bert Holland, and obtained 
unauthorized control over property of the Hollands. 
Because of the presence element ("from his person, 
or immediate presence") in aggravated robbery, different facts 
were required to support the conviction for that crime. Theft 
does not have such an element and different evidence (items 
taken from other rooms of the home) was used to support the 
theft convict ion. 
Respondent can find no Utah cases which define 
"immediate presence". The prevailing view seems to be that 
the property does not need to be attached to the victim in any 
literal sense for property to be taken from his "immediate 
presence." !:_e_o_p_l_e__':._.__l'!_~o-~e_, 13 Mich. App. 320, 164 N.W. 2d 
4 2 3 ( 19h8) ; _s_t_a_t_e_2_· __ M_c_~ona_l_i, Wash. , 4 4 3 P. 2a 6 51 ( 196 3 l ; 
_L_a_n_<":_a_s_t_e_r __ v_. __ ~t_a_t_e_, Okla. Crim., 554 P.2d 32 (1976). Taking 
propPrty from one room while a victim was secured in another 
1•·<>111 was takinq property from his immediate presence. State 
v_. __ c:_a_m_p_b_e_l_l_, 41 Del. 34 2, 22 A. 2d 390 ( 1941). An automobile 
lHkPn from a garage ("the curtilage of the home") was from the 
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immediate presence anrl possession of the owner, while the 
Rtdle_y _v_. :;tate, S4 l""lkla. 
Crim. 219, lR P.~d 281 (101'1; PP0f'lP v. RilUE't, 241 Cill. Tip[» 
2d 632, 50 Cal. Rptr. 687 (l%F,). 
If this Court rlecirles that "immerliate presence" 
includes the various rooms in a home, then the evirlence of 
taking property from other pairs oft.he Hollancls' home is also 
evidence of aggravated robbery ancl not eviclence of theft. If 
the Court finCls that all the eviclence is not separable into 
the two crimes, then respondent alrees that the theft 
conviction should be dismisserl. 
Appellant also contenCls that the crimes were all 
part of a sing le criminal episode and that he cannot be 
punished for both the theft ancl aggravated robbery offenses. 
A "single criminal episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
~ 77-401-1 (1953) as amendecl, as "all conrluct which is closely 
relatecl in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
[W]hen the same act of a rlefendant under a 
s1ngfe-cr1m-rnal-ep1sorle shall establish 
offenses which may be punisherl in 
different ways unrler Clifferent provisions 
of this code, the act shall he punishable 
under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under 
any such provision bars a ptosecution 
unCler any other such prov is itJn. 
Utah Code Ann. 1; 76-l-402(l)(l9Sl), as amenrlerl (emphasis 
adderl). 
A defendant can he prosecuterl for twn or more 
criminal violations ar i si n'l out •lf t ht·• Sd1n0 act or 
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transaction. -~t-~t_e __ v_·--~~m_e_~, Utah, 631 P.2d 854 (1981). In 
Rloclr~h_lJ_r_q_e_r __ v_. __ u_n_i_t_e_d __ s_t_a_t_e__:~• 284 u.s. 299, 304 (1932), the 
!'"ll,,rl Stcites Supreme Court stated: 
The applicable rule is that, where the 
same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses 
or only one is whether each provision 
re~uires proof of an additional fact which 
the other does not. 
If each crime requires proof that the other does not, the 
~~~c:_~b_l!_t_9~__!:_ test is satisfied even though there is some 
overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes. Brown 
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In Albernaz v. United States, -------
450 U.S. 333 (1981), the united States Supreme Court followed 
the ~~~c:_kbul:jl~__!:_ test and upheld the defendant's convictions 
for conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to 
distribute marijuana in a case involving only a single 
agreement or conspiracy. The statutes involved in Albe~ri__~~· 
the Court said, proscribed two different ends, distribution as 
opposed to import at ion. 
As in Albe__r_~, the objectives for punishment of the 
crimes in the present case are different from one another. In 
theft, the punishment aims to prohibit one person from 
obtaining control of another's property without the owner's 
per miss ion. In aggravated robbery, the criminal justice 
system seeks to prohibit two acts: the taking of property 
fr~n another and the use of force to get the property. 
Recause the use of force in aggravated robbery involves a 
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greater danger to human life than the simple unauthorized 
control of another's propett'/ i.n thf' 1·ri11" of theft, the 
criminal code defines d1tferent lv tl1c, r'lement s and punishmc·11t' 
for these crimes. 
In Utah, convictions of crimes iHisrng out of the 
same criminal episode are not prohibiterl under the sinqle 
criminal episode provisions where there are distinct crimes, 
seeking different criminal objectives. ~t_a_t_e __ v_. __ J_o_~e2, 11 
Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 2fi2 (1962) (burglary and larceny); State 
~·--l"._~c_12_1_~, Utah, 584 P.2d Rfil (1978) (agyravated robbery and 
aggravated kidnapping); _s_t_<:_t_EO__v_. __ c:_C!_LJ_C_h_, Utah, fi35 P.2d 89 
(1981) (aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping and forcible 
sodomy). In crimes against the person (as contrasted with 
crimes against property), a single criminal act or episode may 
constitute as many offenses as there are victims. State v. 
James, Utah, 631 P.2d 854 (l'lRl). Respondent urges that the 
crimes of theft and aggravated robbery were shown by differe~ 
acts and that aggravated robbery was committed a'Jainst Lorna 
Holland, while theft was committed against Lorna and Bert 
Hol lancl. 
The single criminal episode provisions are similar 
to the double jeopardy prohibitions. The rlouble jeopardy 
clauses in the United States Constitution, Amend. v,l 
1 "[N]or shall any perso11 he c;11hJect for the 
same offense to he twice put in jeopardv of life or 
limb 
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in the lltah Constitution, art. I, Ii 122, cind in the Utah 
r'n<lr of Crirninal Proceriure, Utah Corie Ann. Ii 
'l-f;(/l(,il(l9S3) as ilmenrien,3 forbiri the State from 
,,.,,,,at<>rl attemrts to convict a riefenriant to protect him from 
lh~ hazarris of trial and possible conviction more than once 
for an alleqeri offense. !'1_c_~_i_!_2._· __ Hay_w_a_r_:'!_, Utah, No. 18650 
(filed June 9, 1983). 
However, convictions of several crimes arising out 
of the same criminal episode may not always be barred under 
clouble jeopardy provisions. ~_a_t_e_2_'.__~o_s_':• TJtah, 598 P.2d 342 
(1979)(carrying loaderi firearm in a vehicle, marijuana 
possession and possession of a firearm by a convicted person). 
The double jeopardy rule protects against subsequent 
prnsecut ion o_n_}_y~o_r _ _!._h_e_s_a_m~~f_e_n_s_r:_. ~ate v_'.__H_arr_i_2, 30 
Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 ( 1974). 
nouble jeopardy therefore does not prevent 
multiple convictions for multiple offenses 
arising from a single criminal episode. 
Likewise, offenses committed against 
multiple victims are not the same, for 
double jeopardy purposes even though 
they may arise from the same criminal 
episode. 
-~t_a_t_e __ v_'.__~o:_m_e_~, Utah, 631 P.2d 854, 856 (1981) (footnotes 
omit tea). 
The United States Supreme Court recently approved 
the the imposition of cumulative punishments for two or more 
"[N]or .shall any person be tv1ice put in jeopardy for 
t Ile same.: of tense." 
"No person shall he put twice in jeopardy for the 
samt' offense . " 
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statutorily defined offenses which constitute the "same" crime 
under the ~-l_oc~~urg_e_!_ test. In Missouri v. Hunter, 
- - -- -------------
Tl. ,~. 
, 103 S.Ct. 673 ( 1983), the Court held that s0ntences for 
both first-degree robbery and armed criminal action in a 
single trial did not violate double jeopardy provisions where 
the legislature specifically authorized the cumulative 
punishment under two statutes. The court said that in a 
single trial, double jeopardy does no more than prevent the 
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended. In the present case, the appellant has 
been subjected to only one trial and "his right to be free 
from multiple trials for the same offense has [not] been 
violated." !:!._i_~souri:__v_. __ l:!_l'._~t-~~· _!_d_., at 678. 
Under the evidence-based standard, theft is not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery in this case 
because different evidence in this case was used to support 
the two convictions. There was no rational basis for 
acquitting defendant of the greater offense (aggravated 
robbery), and convicting him of the included offense (theft). 
Instead, there was sufficient evidence, and different 
evidence, to find appellant guilty of both crimes. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFF'ICEN'T' E'JI lJE:N\f: PRP.SENTED AT 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPEL LAW!" S CONVICTIONS. 
Appellant claims the evidence was insufficent to 
support the verdicts of aggravaterl b1irglary, aggravated 
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robbery and theft. To prevail on this claim, the burden rests 
nn ilpf1el lant to show on appeal that reasonable minds 
,,,,,., sc;ar ily entertain il reasonable doubt that appellant 
<'ommitten the crime. s_t_a_t_e __ v_. _ __l~i,_l_s_o_r:i,, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 
( 1977). 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the 
evidence need not refute contrary allegations made by 
appellant if the vernict is supported by substantial evidence. 
~t_c:,t__~_v_. __ l:,':_"2_":• TJtah, 606 P. 2d 229 ( 1980). The evidence, and 
all inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, is to 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the fact finder's 
verdict. ~-a_t_e __ v~ Gar_c_i_..":, Utah, 663 P.2d 60 (1983); Sta_t_e _ _y_:_ 
Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979). 
-------
This Court recently summarized the standards to be 
applied in reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in State 
v_. __ M_c_~a_r_?_e_l_1:.• Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982): 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man would not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. "Thus, 
intent to commit [a crime] . may be 
found from proof of facts which it 
reasonably could be believed that such was 
defendant's intent." [Citations omitted.] 
N'>t11ilhstandinCJ the presumptions in favor of the jury's 
decision, the appellate court can review the sufficiency of 
-23-
the evidence to support the verdict. In :?_t_a_t_e__v_. __ i:_e_t_r_e_e, Utah, 
659 P.2d 443 (1983), this Court stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the 
defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the ptoof <)f 
guilt. In fulfillment of its nuty to 
review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably he drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. 
But th is does not mean that the court can 
take a speculative leap across a remaining 
gap in order to sustain a vei:dict. The 
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, 
must he sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In any case where the sufficiency of the evidence is 
challenged, it is imperative that the totality of the facts 
and circumstances be reviewed and considered rather than 
isolated portions of it. Yet appellant, chooses to focus 
almost exclusively on the credibility of the testimony of the 
two eyewitness victims, Bert and Lorna Holland. 
Admittedly, theii: testimony was important to the 
State's case. However, their testimony must be viewed in its 
proper context to3ethei: with all of the evidence adduced at 
trial. In addition, the ci:edihility of witnesses is an issue 
for the jury. ~ta~_':._:__1:_C?._m_e_r_~, lltah, 5'i4 P.2d 216 (1976). 
Accordingly, when the total evidence in this case is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's vei:dicts, thei:e is 
sufficient evidence to support appellant's convictions. 
Appellant claims thei:e is insufficient evidence 
because (1) Mr. Holland could not positively pick appellant 
out of a photogi:aphicc display and (2) Mrs. Bolland 
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positively picked a photograph of a person other than 
'il'P"llant in a separate photo display (appellant's brief, 
A complete and careful review of the entire record 
rPveals that the identification evidence was merely one piece 
of the State's total evidentiary picture. In State v. 
r_h_r_i_!3_t_e~__l'!_· Utah, 533 P.2d 872, 87fi (1975), the Court said: 
.it may well be that certain facts of 
the evidence, considered separately, coul 
he regarded as not inculpatory, and thus 
be vulnerable to the accused's claim that 
it does not connect him with the crime. 
However, the law does not require that the 
separate bits of evidence he viewed in 
isolation for it is proper to take 
whatever fragments of proof that can be 
found and piece them together with the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in order to fill in the whole 
mosaic of the crime. 
see also ~tat_~_':_.__Malmr_~~~· Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982), ~t_ate v__'._ 
~o_l_b_e_r_d_i_n_SL, 30 Utah 2d 257, 5lfi P.2d 359 (1973). 
Incriminating evidence, which the jury had but which 
appellant overlooks, was the testimonies of James Nix Rafal 
and Jay Kenneth Sanchez. Rafal and Sanchez were accomplices 
with appellant when the crimes were committed against the 
Hollands. Rafal's and Sanchez's testimonies alone, even 
though they were accomplices to the crime, would be sufficient 
to sustain appellant's convictions. Utah Code Ann. ~ 77-17-7 
(1951), as amended, provides that a "conviction may be had on 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." In conformity 
·nth this statut>0, the trial judge instructed the jury on the 
testimony of an accomplice: 
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You are instructed that an accomplice 
is one who unites with a nut her peor snn in 
the commission of a crime, voluntarily and 
with comr1(Jf"'1 int E. nt. An rlCl'Ofll~i l i(''' df)<•s 
not become incompPt('nt as (, witness 
because of part icipal ion in Uie er im0 
charged. ()n the contrary, thE' law of the 
state of Utah pt,n'!ldes that a convict inn 
may be had on the uncorrohorated testimony 
of an accomrlice. The iury, however, 
should keep in mind that such testimony is 
to be received with caution. 
Jury Instruction Number 19 (R. lln). 
At trial, ,1ames Nix Raf al, who was ciranted immunity 
for his testimony, testified about the events which occurred 
on December 15, 1980, at 6773 South Olivet Drive in Salt Lake 
City. Rafal said Nick Smith and Jay Sanchez arrived at his 
home at about 8:30 p.m. ('T'. 14n-141). The three men were 
planning to rob a house that Smith said had "some coke in it 
and some papers" ('T'. 142). They then picked up appellant and 
drove to the Holland residence after obtaining a shotgun (T. 
145). Rafal and appellant went to the home while Smith and 
Sanchez waited in the car ('T'. 146). When the Hollands denied 
knowledge of "the coke and the papers," Rafal said he and 
appellant tied their hands with duct tape (T. 147). Raf al 
said they searched the house for valuables before they left 
( T. 148). 
Rafal's testimony is supportPrl hy Sanchez, who also 
received immunity from prosecution. ,';anchez was living at the 
Bonneville Corrections Center in Salt Lake City in Decemb~r 
1980 (T. 182). On the night of Dr"cemher 15, 1980, he ohtainc' 
a sponsor to allow him to leave the CrJr r'-'<'l ions Center ('T'. 
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I 'I 4 I • 
Sanchez met Smith and they went to Rafal's home (T. 
Sanchez said Rafal went with them to appellant's home 
111'' l lant also qol into the car (T. l8'i). They then 
"'"c<>r•dl"l tn the J-lolland residence where they planned to 
commit a robbery (T. l8fi). Sanchez said 1'.lafal and appellant 
w0nt into the house and committed the crimes (T. 1SJ6). 
In addition to the testimony of these two 
accomplices, Mr. and Mrs. Holland also testified at trial. 
~lr. Holland told about the crimes and he identified appellant 
at trial as one of the men who entered his home on December 5, 
1980 (T. 46). Mr. Holland said he was asked to look at some 
photngraphs about one week after the crimes occurred (T. 49). 
f!e was not able at the time to make a positive identification 
(T. 50). Appellant's photoqraph was not among those in the 
display. While the police investigation continued, the 
Hollands moved to Idaho and they later participated in another 
photograph identification attempt in March 1982 (T. 56, 83). 
Mr. Holland made a positive identification of Rafal at the 
time (T. 55, 58, 92). He also choose two photographs which 
possibly were of the other assailant (T. 5'i, 92). Appellant's 
photograph was one of the photographs Aert Holland thought 
c'°luld be of the other assailant (T. 'i'i, 92). 
At trial. Bert Holland positively identified 
app0l]ant as one of the assailants (T. 46). At the 
1" 11 rn1 ncit y 1,e,11 i nq, Bert J-lolland testified that he was 75 
I"'' •Ynt sure that appellant was one of the assailants (T. 53) • 
' 1nclPt cross examination at trial, Bert Holland said he 
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remained 75 percent certain that appellant was on0 of the 
assailants (T. 54). 
The testimonies of Rafal, Sanchez anrl R0rt Hollan,J 
are also corroborated hy Lorna Hol lanrl. /'\fter testifyin<J 
about the crimes, Mrs. Hollanrl identified appellant as one of 
the perpetrators of the crime (T. fi7). When asked if his 
appearance harl changed since the day of the crimes, she sairl, 
"His eyes look the same. Don't think it changed a lot" (T. 
6 7). She also said she could not make a positive 
identification when Detective Daryle Onrlrak showed her some 
photographs about one week after the crimes (T. fi8). At the 
photograph identification in Irlaho, she made an iclentification 
of one photograph she thought was one of the assailants (T. 
69, 93-94). The picture she choose was of Robert Taylor, who 
apparently was not involved with the er ime (T. 'l4). 
At trial, Lorna Hollanrl irlentified appellant as one 
of the assailants (T. fi7). At the preliminary hearing, she 
also identified appellant as an assailant (T. 70). Unrler 
cross examination, she was asked if she had positively 
identified appellant at the preliminary hearing (T. 72). She 
said appellant looked similar to one of the persons inside her 
house and "I was very sure that was him, but I don't suppose: 
could say a hundrerl percent. Not positive" (T. 72). 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Holland testifierl that they c01Jld 
not be 100 percent certain that appellant was one of the 
persons who entered their homr>. However, this does not make 
the identification evidence iricnnclusi\le, Mr. Holland was 7' 
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percent sure (T. 'i4) and Mrs. Holland was "very sure that was 
1, i 1n" ( T. 7 2). Moreover, Rafal and Sanchez were also present 
,,1 1 hr~ er ime scene ancl positively identifie<'l appellant as one 
,Jf the persons who committed the crimes. 
From all of the evidence presented, the jury could 
fairly anrl reasonably conclude that appellant committed 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and theft. This Court 
should not disturb the convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the 
convictions and sentences of appellant be affirmed. 
1'lR1. 
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